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BOOK REVIEWS 
Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, by Robert Audi. New York: 
Cambridge, 2000. Pp. xix, 355. $54.95 (cloth). 
FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, Trinity International University 
Robert Audi's latest work on church/ state relations is an important con-
tribution to the ongoing debate in political philosophy and legal theory 
over political liberalism and its requirement that the state remain neutral 
between competing views of the good life and for the state's citizenry and 
elected officials to use public or secular reasons and motivations when 
advancing particular policies. Its purpose is to address "the delicate prob-
lem of how a free and democratic society can achieve an appropriate har-
mony between religion and politics" (2) 
This monograph is a highly nuanced, though clearly and tightly argued, 
defense of one form of political liberalism. Thus, I will attempt to briefly, 
though no doubt inadequately, summarize its contents. I will then discuss 
two points that I believe some Christian philosophers may have particular 
interest. 
Overview of Book 
This book consists of seven chapters, each of which deals with some 
aspect of church/ state relations. Part One (The Foundations of Democracy 
and the Separation of Church and State) contains three chapters. Chapter 1 
(The Plurality of Paths to Liberal Democracy) presents a definition of liberal 
democracy and then considers a number of different moral traditions on 
which one may ground liberal democracy (Utilitarianism, Instrumentalism, 
Kantianism, Virhle Ethics, Communitarianism, Theology, Intuition and 
Common Sense). Audi explores the strengths and weaknesses of each, con-
cluding that "liberal democracy is supportable from a variety of plausible 
starting points" (27). It is unclear why Audi does not mention the natural 
law tradition as a basis on which one may ground liberal democracy 
(though he does mention natural law elsewhere in the text), especially since 
the American Founders,] President Abraham Lincoln/ and a number of 
contemporary philosophers3 defend liberal democracy by appealing to nat-
ural law. Audi concludes this chapter with an analysis of freedom and 
coercion, concluding that when a proposed public policy demands coer-
cion, liberty is the default position if the coercion's justification is in dispute 
among reasonable citizens. 
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Chapter 2 (The Separation of Church and State) is the core of Audi's 
view of church/state relations. In this chapter he discusses, among other 
things, his three central principles of church-state separation: the libertari-
an principle (lithe state must permit the practice of any religion, though 
within limits" [32]), the equalitarian principle ("the state may not be given 
preference to one religion over another" [33]), and the neutrality principle 
("the state should neither favor nor disfavor religion ... as such, that is, give 
positive or negative preference to institutions or persons simply because 
they are religious" [33]). Combining these principles, Audi defends his 
version of political liberalism as it pertains to church/state relations. He 
applies his view to a number of issues including the role of clergy in a lib-
eral state and certain issues in public policy (e.g., public observances, edu-
cational policy, and tax exemption). 
Although I do not know how conversant Audi is in the leading 
church/state cases decided by the U.s. Supreme Court, it is interesting to 
note that his philosophical reasoning is consistent with the dominant inter-
pretation of those decisions. I make this point because it is a testimony to 
Audi's philosophical acumen that his case for the logic of the Court's hold-
ings in these decisions is, in my judgment, far more sophisticated and com-
pelling than the arguments made by the justices who authored those opin-
ions. If I were to embrace Audi's view, it would be because of Audi's first-
rate arguments and not because of the second-rate philosophy that perme-
ates the Court's modem church/ state jurisprudence. 
Chapter 3 (Church-State Separation and the Justification of Govemment 
Power) deals with the relationship between government coercion and reli-
gious reasons, and the role of those reasons in developing and supporting 
public policies. Audi suggests what he calls a surrogacy model of justified 
coercion: the justification of coercion can rely only on public reasons that are 
not connected to any particular ethical tradition and which any rational citi-
zen would accept. As he writes elsewhere in the book: "If fully rational citi-
zens in possession of the relevant facts cannot be persuaded of the necessity 
of coercion-as is common where the coercion is based on an injunction 
grounded in someone else's scripture or revelation-then from the point of 
view of liberal democracy, the coercive action lacks an adequate basis. (123) 
Audi does not deny that one may have religious reasons, but that in order to 
coerce fellow citizens one must have appropriate secular reasons as well. 
Part Two (The Ethics of Citizenship and the Balance of Religious and 
Political Arguments) is perhaps Audi's most creative contribution to 
church/ state relations. In chapter 4 (Religious Convictions and Secular 
Reasons) Aud; explores further what he introduced to the reader in chap-
ter 3. Although his general focus is on advocacy, he delves into numerous 
other questions including the responsibility of citizenship, public persona, 
virtuous conduct, and the delicate balance between the free exercise of reli-
gion and its establishment. 
Chapter 5 (Religion and Ethics) concerns the web of interconnected 
philosophically-derived and theologically-derived ethical beliefs embraced 
by religious people. Audi carefully, and with philosophical deftness, 
defends what he calls the principle of theo-ethical equilibrium: "a rational 
integration between religious deliverances and insights and, on the other 
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hand, secular ethical considerations, including sociopolitical principles of 
the kind that determine the level of permissible freedom in a democracy" 
(130). So, for example (this is my example, not Audi's), if the deliverances 
of one's philosophical reflection leads one to the well-grounded belief that 
the unborn are members of the human community and ought to be protect-
ed by the wider post-natal community, but one's reading of Scripture leads 
one to an ambiguous conclusion about the unborn, one should reexamine 
one's understanding of Scripture, since one has independent reasons to 
affirm the unborn's personhood. Thus, one must continually balance one's 
philosophical and theological insights in order to achieve equilibrium: 
Audi maintains that given God's nature theo-ethical equilibrium is to be 
expected. He applies this concept to both institutions and individuals. 
Although while reading Part Two I found myself at times disagreeing 
with Audi, I was struck and moved by his deep concern for the church and 
his sincere desire to preserve its integrity against the temptation of using 
the power of the pulpit to further partisan political ends. On the other 
hand, Audi is careful not to discourage political activism in the church; he 
is simply calling for religious people to make principled and theologically 
sensitive decisions that will encourage the church's moral vision for society 
while at the same time protecting it from the corruption of partisan politics. 
In Part Three (Civic Virtue and Political Activism in a Religiously 
Pluralistic Democracy) Audi cashes out the principles laid out in Parts One 
and Two. The focus of chapter 6 (Civic Virtue) is the role of citizens and 
their communities in participating in liberal democracy. Audi stresses the 
importance of developing certain virtues in order to nurture good citizen-
ship. In this rich chapter, he discusses the moral ground of civic virtue 
(tying it to some notions outlined in chapter 1), civic virtue and the 
grounds of sociopolitical action, civic virtue and the balancing of religious 
and secular reasons, the place of religious considerations in civic discourse, 
and the institutional dimensions of civic virtue. 
Chapter 7 (Religious Conviction and Political Activism) concerns sever-
al questions surrounding the use and justification of violence and coercion 
employed by those who oppose abortion. This chapter proposes "a frame-
work for peaceful coexistence among these parties" in the abortion debate 
(182). Audi believes this framework may be applied to other controversial 
issues such as assisted suicide, protection of the environment, animal 
rights, and genetic research. (More on this below). 
Some Critical Observations. 
The above is a superficial overview of Audi's book. There are many 
issues that he discusses that I simply could not present in the space allotted 
me. However, there are some questions that one may raise about Audi's 
thesis. The following is a brief presentation of two of those questions. 
1. Definition of Religion 
Audi defines religion, for church-state purposes, as theistic. Because he 
maintains that one needs a secular reason in order to justifiably shape pub-
lic policy, it would seem that Audi needs a secular reason for defining reli-
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gion in the way that he does. He provides one: "Non-theistic religions (if 
indeed there are such in any full-blooded sense of 'religion') pose-other 
things equal-far less serious church-state problems. This is in good part 
(though not entirely) because theistic religions tend to be in certain ways 
authoritarian." (34). But some theists maintain that it is secularism's arro-
gant, indeed authoritarian, intrusion in public life, and its commitment to a 
controversial metaphysics cloaked in neutrality, that has provoked numer-
ous religious believers, who would otherwise be apathetic, to resist this 
intrusion. These believers would argue contra Audi that secular liberal ide-
ology, and the religiously held philosophical commitments of its advo-
cates, raise the most important church-state issues. 
Consequently, because Audi asserts "that one has a prima facie obliga-
tion not to advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts 
human conduct, unless one has, and is willing to offer adequate secular 
reason for this advocacy or support" (86), one may reject his definition of 
religion on that ground. After all, he is asking theists to restrict their con-
duct in the public square by requiring them to have secular reasons,5 but 
many of them may not accept his definition of religion as adequate, 
because, among other things, it defines religion in a way that gives an 
unfair advantage to philosophical perspectives that function as religions 
(epistemologically, ontologically, and metaphysically) in the public and 
private lives of many people." 
Because it seems reasonable to believe that Audi's view of religion is 
flawed (and that non-theistic worldviews are "religious"),? and because he 
concedes that "we are unlikely to find any simple, uncontroversial defini-
tion of 'religion'," (56) it seems that Audi is employing a disputed view of 
religion as a means to restrict the conduct of his fellow citizens, people who 
want to employ (what he calls) "religious" reasons in the public square. 
Recall one of Audi's principles: 
If fully rational citizens in possession of the relevant facts cannot be 
persuaded of the necessity of coercion-as is common where the 
coercion is based on an injunction grounded in someone else's scrip-
ture or revelation-then from the point of view of liberal democracy, 
the coercive action lacks an adequate basis. (123) 
Let us apply this principle to Audi's definition of religion: If fully rational 
citizens (in this case, theistic believers) in possession of the relevant facts 
cannot be persuaded of the necessity of coercion (in this case, requiring that 
they be legally restrained by the state accepting Audi's definition of reli-
gion)-as is common where the coercion is based on an injunction ground-
ed in someone's controversial definition of "religion"-then from the point 
of view of liberal democracy, the coercion lacks an adequate basis. 
If, as Audi argues (see below), difference of opinion between rational 
citizens over the nature of the fetus is adequate to permit abortion, why 
cannot a difference of opinion between rational citizens over the definition 
of religion be adequate to permit "religious" reasons in the public square? 
If, as Audi argues, the abortionist's practice should be protected by the 
state by requiring that other citizens including his adversaries presume 
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him innocent of lmjust killing, why cannot we extend that tolerance, pre-
sumption, and protection to include the deliberations of religious citizens 
who see their reasons for particular policies as inexorably tied to their theo-
logical commitments and religious practice? 
2. Abortion and the Benefit of the Doubt Argument 
In his discussion of abortion (in chapter 7), Professor Audi introduces the 
reader to an argument he believes will help resolve the political conflict that 
the issue has engendered. Audi maintains that because reasonable people 
disagree over fetal personhood, the state would err against liberty of its citi-
zens by prohibiting abortion. Although Audi is correct that reasonable peo-
ple do disagree on this issue, it does not follow from that correct observa-
tion that all arguments produced by these reasonable people are equally 
reasonable. In addition, if disagreement between reasonable people is suffi-
cient to jettison a viewpoint from being reflected in our laws, as Audi sug-
gests of the prolife position, then Audi's political liberalism should be reject-
ed on the same grounds: reasonable people disagree with it. But perhaps 1 
have misunderstood Audi. Maybe he is saying something a bit more mod-
est: when reasonable people disagree on an issue over which liberty itself 
hangs in the balance, we should err on the side of liberty. But that does not 
do the trick for at least one reason: it is not clear that in the abortion debate 
liberty is really the good that is at stake. Let me explain. 
Audi argues that there is a good case to permit abortion, for if it were pro-
hibited on the grounds articulated by prolifers-"someone else's religious 
attitudes or views" (201 )-then we would be violating the principles of liber-
al democracy. Audi writes: "If, for instance, labortion'sl moral status in 
unclear or, in a certain way, controversial, or both, then there may be great 
difficulty in deciding it should be legally prohibited" (195). Audi's case rests 
on what he calls the presumption of innocence, "the presumption that, by treat-
ing actions as innocent (permissible) unless appropriately proven to be 
wrong, in effect corresponds to our normal rights of liberty, moral and 
sociopolitical" (200). Ironically, Audi's presumption argument is similar to 
one employed by prolifers to argue the very opposite of his position.s 
Briefly, the argument goes something like this. If it is true that no one 
position on fetal personhood wins the day, this is an excellent reason not to 
permit abortion, since an abortion may result in the death of a human entity 
who has a full right to life. If one kills another being without knowing 
whether that being is a person with a full right to life, and if one has reason-
able grounds (as Audi admits) to believe that the being in question is a per-
son, such an action would constitute a willful and reckless disregard for oth-
ers, even if one later discovered that the being was not an other, a person. 
Audi seems to imply that the different positions on fetal personhood all 
have able defenders, persuasive arguments, and passionate advocates, but 
none really wins the day. To put it another way, the issue of fetal person-
hood is up for grabs; all positions are in some sense equal, none is better 
than any other. But if this is the case, then it is safe to say that the odds of 
the fetus being a human person are 50/50. Given these odds, it would 
seem that society has a moral obligation to err on the side of life, and there-
fore, to legally prohibit virtually all abortions. 
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Consider this illustration. Imagine the police are able to identify some-
one as a murderer with only one piece of evidence: his DNA matches the 
DNA of the genetic material found on the victim. The police subsequently 
arrest him, and he is convicted and sentenced to death. Suppose, howev-
er, that it is discovered several months later that the murderer has an iden-
tical twin brother, who obviously has the same DNA. This means that 
there is a 50/50 chance that the man on death row is the murderer. Would 
the state be justified in executing this man? Surely not, for there is a 50/50 
chance of executing an innocent person. Consequently, if it is wrong to kill 
the man on death row, it is then wrong to kill the fetus when the argu-
ments for its personhood are just as reasonable as the arguments against it. 
Oddly, Audi grants the presumption of innocence to the abortionist 
rather than the fetus, a being whose status makes the essential moral differ-
ence. Thus, it is not clear that in the abortion debate that liberty should be 
the default position when there is an even chance that the exercise of that 
liberty will result in the unjustified homicide of a human person. 
Conclusion 
Given the rising importance of religion in our nation's political life, 
Professor Audi's careful and thoughtful study is much needed. Although 
one may raise questions about some aspects of Audi's work, as I have in 
this review, it brings a distinctly Christian voice into the conversation, a 
voice that for too long has been drowned out by the secular defenders of 
political liberalism and the long and growing list of its Christian and non-
Christian critics.~ 
NOTES 
l. See the Declaration of Independence. 
2. Harry Jaffa, The Crisis of the House Divided (New York: Doubleday, 1959) 
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motivations in addition to religious ones, Audi is in fact restricting their con-
duct, for he is saying that they ought not to shape public policy unless they 
have such reasons. But if his very definition of "religion" is in dispute among 
reasonable people, and that definition is used as a standard by which to assess 
the permissibility of a citizen's reasons, Audi is in fact employing his disputed 
view of religion in order to coerce his fellow citizens, some of whom do not 
believe, for good reason, that the definition is adequate. 
6. For philosophical and legal defenses of a broader definition of religion 
that includes secular, philosophical, and religious commitments in addition to 
theism, see Roy Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); and Joel Incorvaia, "Teaching 
Transcendental Meditation in Public Schools: Defining Religion for 
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Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics, by J.P. Moreland & 
Scott B. Rae. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000. Pp.384. $22.99. 
BRUCE R. REICHENBACH, Augsburg College 
It takes a lot of spunk to swim against the intellechwl tide; to do it well 
and convincingly takes serious intellectual work. The authors, an ethicist 
and a biblical scholar, demonstrate plenty of both in their spirited defense 
of Thomistic dualism. They are not alone in their anthropological assess-
ment; their company includes noted contemporary Christian philosophers 
like Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, Charles Taliaferro, and William 
Hasker, who espouse divergent types of dualism. But their view will not 
be popular in the current cultural milieu. 
The first chapter, which sets the stage for the rest of the discussion, estab-
lishes the approach the authors intend to take in addressing the issue of the 
human person. Rejecting the view that we should "'re-examine the claimed 
cognitive content of Christian theology in the light of the new knowledge 
derivable from the sciences'" (Peacock), the authors hold that "when it 
comes to addressing the nature of human persons, science is largely incom-
petent either to frame the correct questions or to provide answers" (40-1). 
Their method, following the Reformed theological model, is first to "formu-
late an adequate Christian world view, beginning with biblical teaching and 
the contours of church history, then to employ philosophy with a special 
emphasis on scriptural teaching, ... guided by common sense beliefs ... and 
our own first-person awareness of ourselves and our inner states" (44). 
"Philosophy," they conclude, "is autonomous from and more authoritative 
than science even in some areas that are properly within the domain of sci-
ence itself (e.g., the nature of time, space, causation, consciousness, the per-
son)." Finally, "ethical knowledge [is] a source of information for adjusting 
the ontological model when appropriate and relevant" (46). 
Thus, as expected, the opening chapter contains their fundamental theo-
logical and biblical arguments. The philosophical argument goes: "God is 
the paradigm case (i.e., clearest example) of a person, and arguably angels 
are as well.. .. God is an immaterial reality, most likely an immaterial sub-
